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THE LOGIC OF VILLAINY:
SHAKESPEARE'S USE OF THE FALLACIES

by Louis E. Dollarhide

When Moth tells Don Armado in Love's Labors Lost that
Samson was a man of “great carriage for he carried the town
gates on his back like a porter,” the reader can easily recognize
that the irrepressible page is using a logical turn; or when
Touchstone proves by circuitous argument that Corin is damned
because he has never been to court, the logical play is equally as
obvious.
kind of witty jesting is characteristic of Shakes
pearean comedy. Not so obvious is the fact that when Richard
III persuades Anne that she is accessory to his crimes, he mis
leads her with one of the logical fallacies, or that when Iago
persuades the gullible Moor that Desdemona is unfaithful, he
traps Othello with a similar kind of sophistry. A close reading of
the plays of Shakespeare shows that in drawing his witty
villains, those characters like Richard III, Iago, and Edmund,
who rise more by intellectual cunning than by force of arms,
Shakespeare made conscious use of the logical fallacies as char
acterizing devices. Furthermore, an examination of the logic of
key speeches in plays other than those in which the great
villains appear can give subtle evidence as to Shakespeare’s in
tentions.

The fact that Shakespeare was trained in the art of logic is no
longer a matter of serious conjecture. From the exploratory
work of Hardin Craig 1 to the more thorough studies of T. W.
Baldwin2 and Sister Miriam Joseph,3 the extent of this know
1 Hardin Craig, “Shakespeare and Formal Logic, Studies in English Philology, A
Miscellany in Honor of Frederick Klaeber, ed. Kemp Malone and M. B. Rand (Minne
apolis, Minnesota, 1929), pp. 380-396.
2 T. W. Baldwin, William Shakespeare’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke, II, (Ur
bana, Illinois 1944).
3 Sister Miriam Joseph, Shakespeare’s Use of the Arts of Language (New York,
1947).
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ledge has been amply demonstrated. More detailed studies of
specific and meaningful
of the arts of language in various
aspects of Shakespearean drama have been made possible by the
important work of these scholars. The purpose of this paper is
to look into the patterns of sophistry as they are woven charac
teristically by the great villains and, as a ramification, to suggest
how such an investigation can throw light on motivation and
meaning other plays and with other characters.4
In his Rule of Reason, Thomas Wilson included a discussion
of the fallacies, as he said, “even as Aristotle hath set them
furth” in order to teach the unwary both to recognize and to
confute them. Calling them “deceiptful” arguments or repraehensiones, he declared that “even in weightie matters, ye
wicked have derived their subtle defenses from these deceiptful
corners. . . .”5 As set down by Aristotle and repeated by logi
cians since his time, the list of fallacies runs to thirteen—six
subtleties in dictione, in the word, and seven subtleties in re, or
material fallacies. The fallacies in dictione
all related in some
way to
of logical and rhetorical ambiguity. A word is
used having more than one meaning.
are joined which
should be kept separated, or things belonging together are
falsely divided. The material fallacies, on the other hand, be
cause they derive from the substance or total statement rather
than from the word,
more difficult to detect.
Except for the quality of “abstract villainy,” noted by E. K.
Chambers,6 I find nothing in the rather crude, unconvincing
portrait of Aaron in Titus Andronicus to connect him with the
great villains of later plays. The study of masterful villainy
Shakespeare must begin with Richard III. Without attempting
to catalogue all evidences of sophistry,
may observe that in
his portrayal of Richard III, Shakespeare stresses two main
4 Some of the material for this paper was taken from the writer’s doctoral study,
Shakespeare’s Richard III and Renaissance Rhetoric” (unpublished Ph.D. disserta
tion, Department of English,
of North Carolina, 1954),
Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason, Conteining the Arte of Logique (London,
1552), V123-R124. A good modern discussion of the fallacies appears Horace W.
B. Joseph, Introduction Logic (2nd
Oxford, 1916), pp. 566-596.
E. K. Chambers, William Shakespeare, A Study of Facts and Problems (Oxford,
1930), I,

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/ms_studies_eng/vol10/iss1/5

2

Dollarhide: The Logic of Villainy: Shakespeare’s Use of the Fallacies
51

LOUIS E. DOLLARHIDE

traits of thought—Richard’s persistent sophistry and his un
failing irony. Richard is, as Sister Joseph has observed, a
“master of sophistic.”7 It is, therefore, suitable to the processes
of his perverted wit that he take as his handbook “those places
of crafte,” the fallacies. In his own play Richard alerts his
audience to this kind of reasoning in his opening soliloquy,
which is not an interior monologue but an oration delivered
directly to the audience. The speech,
which Richard, in
almost playful terms, explains why he must play the villain, is
the amplification of a single hypothetical syllogism, as purpose
fully false as Richard’s logic is to the end of the play:
If a man is not shaped to play the lover,
he must play the villain.
Richard is not so shaped.
Therefore, Richard must prove a villain.

The fallacy, listed as the third material fallacy by Wilson, is
Secundum non causam, ut causam, the fallacy of trying to
prove a matter by a cause which is not able to prove it.8 The
fact that Richard uses an Elizabethan commonplace concerning
deformity as his excuse for future villainy does not conceal the
fallacy of his argument. In his essay “Of Deformity” Bacon
states that the course which persons so afflicted must take
freeing themselves from “scorn must be either by virtue or
malice.”9 For Richard there is only one way.
In scene after scene, episode after episode, Richard, the
“bottl’d spider,” weaves his web of sophistry. As a part of his
ironies, he uses fallacies in dictione to tell shocking truths,
which, though apparent to the audience, are concealed by am
biguity from his victims. For example, when he tells his brother
Clarence that he will deliver him from prison or else “lie” for
him, Clarence is unaware of the double meaning of the term; or
when he tells Anne at the end of his debate with her that his
heart is “figur’d” in his tongue, Anne is not aware that the word
7 Sister Joseph, p. 226.
8 Wilson, R150.
9 Francis
The Essays on Counsels Civil and Moral, ed. Melville B. Anderson
(Chicago, 1892), pp. 216-217. See also Hardin Craig, An Interpretation of Shakes
peare (New York, 1948), p. 69.
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can mean the placing of the middle term in a logical argument
as well as a setting forth or prefiguring.10 In the debate which
goes before this statement Richard has overcome Anne with
argument whose validity depends on the truth of the middle
term:
The “causer” (Anne) is as guilty as the “executioner”
(Richard).
Anne’s beauty is the “causer.”
Anne is, therefore, guilty of Richard’s crimes.
Technically Richard has “placed” the term correctly, according
to Wilson: that is, it appears first in the major premise and last
in the minor; but the fallacy,11 the material fallacy of accident,
lies in Richard’s proposing that Anne’s beauty is the efficient
cause and then subtly passing from an adjunct (Anne’s beauty)
to the subject (Anne herself) as if no breach of logic had been
committed.
In his lengthier and more formal debate with Elizabeth in Act
IV, Richard finds himself pitted against an opponent who has
almost as keen a wit as he has. Elizabeth successfully parries
argument Richard can bring in until he is finally returned
to the only basis of argument open to him—his professed re
pentance and good intentions, probabilities, which by their very
nature are highly circumstantial and tentative. The trap into
which Elizabeth falls is the sixth material fallacy according to
Wilson 12— the fallacy of the consequent, ad posse ad esse, non
est bona consequentia: because something is possible or
probable, it does not follow that it
be so. Accepting these
probabilities is, in effect, an act of placing faith in Richard’s
character and word. All of Elizabeth’s experience, which is the
only real argument she can offer in rebuttal, is against her doing
so. And yet Richard swears his great oath “to prosper and re
pent”; and as he presses home how necessary her daughter is to
him, to Elizabeth herself, and to England, she is shown relenting
and finally falling as others had fallen, victim to his sophistry.

Of Shakespeare’s later creations two of the greatest villains,
10 See Wilson, V53-V62.
11 Ibid., F140.
12 Ibid. V158.
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Claudius and Macbeth, do not belong within the limits of this
investigation. They
not, like Iago, Edmund, and Iachimo,
progeny of Richard III. It is true that they must trade in appear
ances and in slanders, but neither takes the delight in wrong
doing that the witty villains do. Claudius and Macbeth must do
terrible things to save themselves, but they suffer in conscience
for their sins long before retribution overtakes them. And the
kind of wit which Richard passes on to his successors is not part
of their composition. While not developed as fully as Richard
himself, the true heirs of Richard III are Iago, Edmund, and a
late character in Cymbeline, Iachimo.

The chief difference between Richard III and these later
villains is the fact that none of them has opponents as strong as
Richard has and consequently none is forced to rely on his wits
to the extent that Richard is. He must persuade Anne and Eliza
beth and the English populace who are at enmity with him from
the first; they must delude Othello and Gloucester and Posthu
mous Leonatus, who suspect them of no wrongdoing. Only
Iachimo has to gather evidence and argue a case. Iago and
Edmund work on characters who are either credulous or too
noble to suspect that evil can lie in the heart of another man.
Except for an occasional use of a fallacy in dictione, the pattern
of persuasion which these later villains
rests primarily on the
fallacy of accident. Almost invariably their proofs are related to
the problem of seeming and being, a distinction which Hamlet
clearly states when
reproves his mother for the use of the
word “seems” in referring to his grief: “Seems, Madam! I know
not ‘seems.’ ” These outward things, such as his “suit of solemn
black” and the “windy suspirations of forc’ breath,” are mere
adjuncts or accidents to the reality of his grief. On the basis of
this distinction between seeming and being, the villains work.
Iago announces in Scene i, “I am not what I am.” In his first
soliloquy, like Richard III, he attempts to justify or explain his
later villainy; and like Richard, he uses the fallacy of trying to
prove a matter by a cause which is not able to prove it. He
been passed over for Cassio. He suspects that Othello has cuck
olded him, and for mere suspicion he will act. In persuading
Roderigo, his first gull, that Desdemona will tire of Othello, he
bases his argument on the fallacy of accident, making the “acts
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of courtesy” between her and Cassio appear in the worst
possible light as but “prologue to the history of lust.” In the
same way with Othello, he adds accident to accident until
Othello in agony exclaims “this denoted a foregone con
clusion.” From there on each bit of added evidence serves only
as substantiation until Othello’s “occupation” is indeed

In like manner, Edmund plays upon his credulous father and
his noble brother. Gloucester is easily duped by the forged
letter, even though Edmund must authenticate the handwriting,
and by slanders which Edmund speaks openly.
Edgar the
course is simpler; he has only to frighten him away. In similar
fashion he dupes Goneril and Regan, separately, into thinking
he is in love with them. lachimo, the Iago-like schemer of
Cymbeline, sets out to prove that Imogen is faithless. To do
this, he cynically tries to win Imogen by reporting to her that
Leonatus is a reveller and then offering himself as a means of
revenge. When he is repulsed, realizing that Imogen is as chaste
as her husband believes her to be, he must resort to subterfuge
to make her appear to be false. Gaining access to her bed
chamber by concealing himself in a trunk, he goes about making
note of accidents with which to prove her false—the details of
the room, the bracelet from Imogen’s arm, and finally the mole
on her breast. When he reports to Leonatus that she is false, the
husband refutes the evidence of the room as proof; he is shaken
by sight of the bracelet, but he accepts Iachimo’s knowledge of
the mole as proof positive of Imogen’s guilt. Leonatus is not the
mark that the victims of Iago and Edmund are, but in the
end he is hoodwinked by the same kind of circumstantial evi
dence, based on the fallacy of accident, which had misled the
other characters.
Beyond the villains themselves, Shakespeare found the falla
cies useful in indicating motivation and dramatic intention in
the creation of such deluded or self-deluded characters as Bru
tus, Othello, and King
This fact is illustrated clearly
enough in the person of Brutus. In spite of his apparent sym
pathy for Brutus, Shakespeare gives sufficient clues in the play
to leave no doubt as to his attitude toward the part of Brutus in
the conspiracy. An early clue is Cassius’ short Richard-like com-
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ment on the way Brutus has responded to his own suggestion of
revolt against Caesar:
Thou, Brutus, thou art noble; yet, I see,
Thy honourable metal may be wrought
From that it is disposed. . . .
But the clearest indication of Shakespeare’s intentions is in the
speech of self-justification which Brutus makes in Act II. Alone
in his garden, awaiting the arrival of his fellow conspirators,
Brutus considers the step they are about to take. “It must be by
his death,” he begins. He has no “personal cause” to bring
against Caesar; what he and his fellow conspirators are about to
do is for the general good. Although Caesar has that day three
times rejected a crown, Brutus is certain that he wants to be
king. He announces the matter for deliberation, “How that
might change him, there’s the question.” His manner of
development in the confirmatio or proof of his speech is to
begin with a proverb (in logic a matter of common human
experience) and apply the truism to the matter under delibera
tion: “It is the bright day that brings forth the adder,” “Th’
abuse of greatness is when it disjoins / Remorse from power,”
“lowliness is young Ambition’s ladder / Whereto the climberupward turns his face. ...” But the sententiae merely throw a
coloring of truth over the basic fallacy of Brutus’ whole argu
ment, and their use in this instance amounts to a secondary
fallacy, that of Secundum Quid.13 The basic fallacy, which the
sententiae do not hide, lies in the fact that the proof rests on a
probability: Caesar “might” change; he “may” do danger; “So
Caesar may; / Then, lest he may, prevent.” But Brutus admits
that this probability, on which he tries and finally executes his
friend, is against his own experience:
to speak truth of Caesar,
I have not known when his affection sway’d
than his reason.
But in spite of the inadequate basis of his proof, he concludes
that he will think of Caesar as a “serpent’s egg,”

13 Ibid. ,R150-V151.

Published by eGrove, 1969

7

Studies in English, Vol. 10 [1969], Art. 5

56

THE LOGIC OF VILLAINY

Which, hatch’d, would, as
kind, grow mischievous,
And kill him in the shell.
Having convinced himself that
is the figurative un
hatched serpent, Brutus no longer looks back. The whole basis
of
self-justification rests on the fallacy of the consequent.
Although he is a dupe of one of the great villains and their
relationship commented upon above, Othello deserves indivi
dual comment because of the nature of the change in his
character between Acts I and III. As he is shown in the first act,
particularly in his great speech before the Senate, Othello is a
master of the arts of language. His defense is so nobly stated, he
is so completely in control of himself and the situation that the
Duke must say, “I think this tale would win my daughter too.”
Even after his composure is shattered by Iago’s insinuations, he
makes one last effort in Act III, Scene iii, to see his plight
rationally. “Villain, be sure you prove my love a whore,” he
tells Iago. “I’ have some proof,” he says. “Give me a living
reason she’s disloyal.” But it is already too late. Sure of his
prey, Iago has pronounced over him
diabolical charm, “Not
poppy, nor mandragora, / Nor all the drowsy syrups of the
world. ...” Demanding proof, Othello ends by accepting as
conclusive evidence a purported dream and his wife’s handker
chief, which he had himself thrust from Desdemona’s hand only
a few moments earlier. And on this flimsy basis, he tries and
executes the one person in the world he loves. The contrast
between the measured
of Othello’s early appearance and
the shattered un-reason of his mental processes at the climax of
the play serves to accentuate the tragic decline of the heroic
Moor.
And so with other characters. Blinded by jealousy like
Othello, Leontes in The Winter’s Tale acts as his own Iago. He
distorts Hermione’s entertainment of Polixines into “paddling
palms and pinching fingers,” and misconstrues Camillo’s inno
cent statements about Hermione to mean that he has already
been cuckolded. From mere accidents he leads himself into de
manding, like Othello, the death of his best freind and his be
loved wife. In King Lear, the old king’s vanity contest is made
to seem even more fatuous by the fact that he accepts testi
mony rather than experience as evidence of love. When the
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truth at last strikes home, he must cry, “O most small fault, /
How ugly didst thou in Cordelia show!” And in Much Ado
About Nothing, Claudio and Don Pedro are misled by Don
John, a progeny of Richard III briefly sketched in a context of
comedy. In spite of their previous knowledge of him, they per
mit themselves to be trapped by his “proof” of Hero’s infi
delity. They accept appearances without further investigation.
Benedict and Beatrice, on the other hand, steadfastly refuse to
be misled. Borachio says Claudio and Don Pedro were deceived
partly by Don John’s oaths, partly by the dark night, but
“chiefly by my villainy which did confirm any slanders that
Don John had made.” But they were misled. And on the basis
of mere appearances, they disgrace an innocent girl.

Having established the pattern of villainous thought
his
first great emblem of wickedness, Richard III, Shakespeare con
tinued the same pattern with variations in Iago, Edmund, and
Iachimo. In addition, he made use of the fallacies to give his
audience subtle clues as to meaning and motivation in the por
trayal of erring, though sympathetic, characters like Brutus. An
examination of his use of the logical fallacies can, in effect, add
a new dimension to our understanding of his plays.
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